The purpose of this article is to clarify the nature of legal professions as experts. In particular, an attempt has been made to answer the question of what, in the case of these professions, is the social role that requires the application of abstract knowledge to specific cases. The starting point for consideration is social theories that see this role as a mediation and integration of the social structure. Next, using the methodology of cognitive metaphor, this characterization is further clarified by juxtaposing it with another type of expert activity, i.e., translation. Thus, practical problems were identified in the work of a lawyer, related to mediating in the social structure between abstract knowledge of law and solving individual legal problems. These problems were characterized primarily as difficulties in the use of different languages by institutions and citizens.

An attempt to explain what constitutes the legal professions is an endeavor arguably as old as the legal professions themselves. Nowadays, they are usually not focused on the search for their universal essence and, consequently, the values attributed to them, but rather on characterizing them with the help of three types of factors, being systemic, i.e., the place of these professions in the social division of labor, functional, i.e., primarily the tasks performed by them, and interactional, i.e., what activities their members perform within the framework of relations with other entities. From a legal perspective, finding a characterization of legal professions using these three factors presents little difficulty. This is because they are public trust professions performed as liberal professions. They service the law as such, and by doing so, they are complicit in the application of the law and the protection of individual rights and, therefore, are, as is often put, a coefficient of justice. They perform this task by providing legal assistance, i.e., representing clients before courts and authorities and advising them in legal matters in order to protect their interests or legal assets.

It is somewhat more difficult to make such a characterization from the point of view of social sciences. An approach that emphasizes the importance of functional factors and applies not only to legal professions but also to liberal professions in general, seems to be the most widespread, according to which, their role is to apply general rules of conduct to specific situations, where on the one hand these rules are becoming increasingly complicated due to the dynamics of social development, and on the other hand they do not themselves determine the manner of this application. Consequently, such professions, and lawyers in particular, are becoming increasingly important in modern societies. As a professional group, they must themselves broaden their knowledge to fulfill their role in a changing social environment and, at the same time, cannot be subjected to effective external control.[1] Both their responsibility and autonomy increase. Of course, failure to meet this responsibility may lead to attempts to limit their autonomy and increase control over them, but in the long run, this will be ineffective and tend to turn into mere repression.

In contrast, coping with increasing responsibility requires a growing awareness and understanding of one’s role in society. In doing so, one can assume that it will be helpful to characterize this role as one of an expert.[2] This emphasizes a relationship between the performance of these professions with increasingly complex and specialized knowledge and, at the same time, their special position vis-à-vis laypeople who do not have easy access to it. Of course, barriers to this access should be understood in a broad sense, including not only constraints with regard to the acquisition of information (which seems to be of decreasing importance) but also on its interpretation and application (which is growing in importance). Therefore, one of the key questions about the expert nature of legal professions is how these barriers can be crossed. How can lawyers perceive their role to make this possible? Can they adopt some kind of attitude or acquire a certain kind of cultural competence to do so?

The following analysis will attempt to address this problem using a methodology based on the cognitive metaphor theory. In short, this consists of the fact that more abstract concepts (belonging to the target domain) are based on less abstract ones (belonging to the source domain). There is a regular mapping relationship between them, that is, transferring certain features from the latter to the former so that we are able to better understand them.[3] In the case of legal professions, the application of a methodology based on these assumptions serves to analyze the extent to which their expert nature can be understood as based on our understanding of other such professions. In doing so, one may reach out to a whole variety of professions.[4] This article will discuss – as is often the case in the literature – the understanding of the lawyer’s role as a translator.

The validity of such a juxtaposition and treating it as a cognitively meaningful metaphor can already be seen at an intuitive level when we consider a lawyer as doing something similar to translating an utterance from one language into another. Thus, he/she uses his/her general knowledge of language to formulate specific statements in another language, secondary to the source. In the simplest terms, we can say that it is a translation from the natural language used by the client into a broader language of law, including legal and legalistic language, and vice versa – from the language of law into that used by the client. Of course, the simplification here lies primarily in the fact that natural and legal languages are not separate languages that could be distinguished on the basis of ethnicity. Rather, as we know, legal language is just some variation of an ethnic one.[5] Therefore, one cannot speak of translation in the strict sense. However, the distinctions which exist between the utterances formulated in the two languages must be taken into account and somehow bridged by the lawyer, which is precisely the basis for formulating the translation metaphor as a metaphor, rather than treating the lawyer’s activity as translation par excellence. It is obviously not just a difference in the generality of expression, i.e., formulation of norms by means of abstract-and-general terms and formulation of the client’s utterances in a concrete and individual way, but rather it is the differences existing at the level of terminology, meaning, and syntax.

In the literature, the expert nature of the translation metaphor is emphasized, among others, by P. Kaczmarek, who, using Z. Bauman’s thesis on the end of the era of legislators and the coming of the era of translators, formulated an opinion that lawyers face a dilemma of choosing between the role of a legislator and the role of a translator. Legislator is a metaphorical term for an intellectual and, as the author argues, also for a lawyer who acts based on the certainty of institutional order. His/her activity is directed toward legitimizing this order by demonstrating its grounding in universal principles. This is explained by a general theory he/she applies to individual cases. The metaphorical translator, on the other hand, operates in a situation of a permanent dispute over interpretation and the universal right to interpret, exercised by all, not just experts. He/she is understood here as someone whose task is not to legitimize the institution, but to create its image – to explain and clarify its functioning to other subjects. The translator guarantees that the translation conforms to the rules of a given institution and can demonstrate that it is acceptable by a given community. According to the author, the lawyer’s very choice of whether to act as a legislator or as a translator is a moral choice, an element of which is whether he/she limits his/her moral responsibility for acting within the limits of an institution or assumes such responsibility.[6]

A broader and somewhat different development of the translation metaphor, however, can be found primarily in the work of J.B. White, one of the founders of the law and literature movement. He tries to develop the concept of justice as translation. A context for such a defined purpose of consideration is the fragmentation of culture and the problem of its integration. He finds that contemporary professional discourses, which are highly specialized and technical, often become monological and thus sterile or even dead. He rejects such solutions to this problem as, for instance, replacing professional language or the professional voice with an informal, personal, or entirely individually shaped language. This would lead to the same emptiness and hermeticism. He also considers solutions relying on interdisciplinarity, as well as various types of transplantations between disciplines, to be unsatisfactory. He points out that they are based on a territorial metaphor, in which various disciplines have their area defined by their boundaries, which can then possibly be crossed. This means treating professional knowledge as entirely objective and bureaucratically defragmented.[7]

Instead, the author proposes an approach based on the processes of translation and literary creation. Therefore, he postulates the adoption of certain achievements of literary theory, critical theory, and hermeneutics. In particular, he draws attention to the issue of composition – the interweaving of different voices in texts without losing their individuality. Thus, he tries to develop a concept in which integration of law with other areas of culture would not consist in the lawyers’ crossing the borders of their discipline, but in learning how to compose their texts in such a way that they use many voices or languages, and at the same time, because of the way of this composition, they could see themselves as their authentic creators. In doing so, the author realizes that legal discourse today is primarily a discourse of power. However, he postulates a departure from such thinking, which would create, in his opinion, opportunities for criticism of legal texts, such as in literary discourse, especially in the case of translations. Putting the lawyer in the shoes of a translator will result in the realization that translation is never simple and must always be based on respect. There are serious grounds for this because law, especially its application, includes a mechanism for confronting different languages and establishing their hierarchy. Recognizing the diversity of languages and accepting languages other than the language of law is a political and ethical challenge for lawyers.[8]

From this point of view, the author analyzes the issue of conceptual language, which is also characteristic of law, and according to whom, using the category of a concept has far-reaching consequences. First of all, it presupposes a reference to an extra-linguistic reality, such as the mind or idea. The language appears here as transparent, and the content of the concept as something which can be proven or demonstrated. In this context, concepts are translatable, which makes learning another language a mere technicality. However, it is also this feature of conceptual language that contributes to its oppressive nature, as it leads to the need to guard the purity of concepts within a discipline, and to assume the primacy of their meanings over other disciplines. By contrast, in the author’s view, meaning is use and, therefore, terms such as “semantic field” and other territorial metaphors are unacceptable. Meaning is not private either, of course, but there is always some residuum in it – something very individual and personal, inaccessible to others. Rather, the units of language, e.g., individual words or sentences, are certain possibilities of use in a particular context, which means, however, locating the subject in a particular culture. This creates a tension between the concreteness and generality of language. In literary texts, this tension is used to run two narratives at the same time, and the better the composition between them, the better the literature we deal with.[9]

A similar tension can be seen in lawyers’ texts such as pleadings or court justifications, which are composed through the use of the general and abstract language of legal acts on the one hand and the individual and concrete language of facts on the other. Central to the quality of the text is the interaction between these languages and their narratives. They are currently dominated by an academic style, which is conceptual and aggressive in the sense that it is geared towards the author’s narrative occupying a kind of territory. However, focusing only on the general and abstract aspect cannot be a good composition of, for example, judicial reasoning. It should be more argumentative and critical, or simply conversational because only then will it allow proper transitions between narratives.[10]

The conversational character of legal texts is possible, inter alia, due to the fact that the lawyer, on the one hand, is their author, while on the other hand, he/she appears in them as a reader of other texts – both legal and those coming from the client.[11] Being in this position, he/she should, according to the author, act as a translator. The author posits that translation is an art of recognizing, acknowledging, and responding to another person and the language they use. This puts the translator between languages and people, allowing the differences between them and, therefore, their identities, to be seen more clearly than from other perspectives. In the act of translation, the translator, like the author of a text, asserts his/her own identity while being constrained by the recognition of the distinctiveness of others and the need to respond to their texts. Therefore, translation is a model for justice, which by its very nature also concerns relationships between people. The author repeatedly emphasizes this last element, i.e., that translation and justice are about proper relationships between people.

Translation is also a complex practice that requires skill and ethics, and this is further illustrated by using the etymology of the term itself. Namely, translation comes from the Latin trans (through) and latus (to transfer), so it is a kind of transfer of meaning. However, following J. Ortega y Gassett, it is assumed that such a transfer is never fully possible and does not occur in a one-to-one relationship. It is because the translator always performs a twofold transformation of the meaning – it consists in producing a deficiency and exuberance of the meaning. The former are situations when certain meanings are not reflected in the translated text, and the latter are those that were not present in the source text but can be found in the target text.[12]

To become aware of them is at the same time to become aware of one’s limits, which in turn makes it possible for translation to be a model for ethics. Translation requires both recognition of the value of another’s language and one’s own limitations. Thus, it must not be motivated by a desire to dominate or appropriate but must be based on respect. Translation, therefore, does not consist of moving concepts from one lexical unit to another. Since there is no translation without a change in the meaning, it can be said to involve the production of an independent text relating to the original one. In creating it, one must keep in mind not concepts, or at least not primarily, but rather the relationships between texts, languages, and people, and these are to be the basis of its composition.

The same is true of interpretation, which for the author is an extension of translation – it also puts the interpreter between two texts with the knowledge that he/she will never succeed in fully reflecting the text being read because two uses of words are always unequal, and each interpretation is unique. Interpretation, then, is as much a creative process as translation – it is the authorial production of a text consisting of a composition based on different languages, necessarily containing excesses and exuberances of the meaning in relation to the original text, and requiring an ethical attitude, full of respect for other people and languages.[13]

In the author’s opinion, the metaphors of justice as translation and a lawyer as a translator thus perfectly capture the essence of his/her work. For he/she must translate whenever reading a legal text. It occurs between the historically established meanings of legal language and the language of specific contemporary subjects such as the addressees of the norms, and, of course, the other way round. This makes the lawyer both a marginal and central figure in the application of law. Marginal, because he/she is always dealing with the client’s case, not his/her own. He/she translates the language and situations which are structurally outside of it. While he/she must act respectfully and try to learn the language spoken by the client, this does not change the fact that he/she will always remain a stranger to the client. At the same time, the lawyer appears as a central figure because law is nevertheless a discourse of power that subordinates and binds together all other discourses. How the lawyer translates one language into another, and whether it is truly based on appreciation and respect, will make a significant difference to the client.[14]

A slightly different approach to this issue is taken by C.D. Cunningham, who, incidentally, refers to the views of J.B. White and tries to develop them. The author proposes the metaphor of the lawyer as a translator to show that when representing a client, the lawyer performs something similar to the act of translation and, as a consequence, this always results in a change of the meaning of the narrative presented by the client. This is due to the fact that no translation is perfect, and two languages are never fully compatible. However, by working with his/her client, a good translator can avoid such a change of the meaning that would lead to any serious distortion and negative consequences. Thus, he/she is able to compensate in a certain way for the imperfections resulting from the translation, and even enrich the sense of the utterance, thus playing a positive role despite the objective impossibility of a perfect translation. It should be noted, however, that the risk of such a distortion is, of course, especially present in the case of differences in perspectives between the translator and the client due to gender, race, or social class.[15]

Thus, it also always occurs on legal grounds and is further reinforced by the fact that the meanings of legal language are never shared by all members of society. Thus, the metaphor of the lawyer as a translator shows that when representing the client, the client’s position is often distorted or even partially “silenced”. The reason for this is errors made by lawyers, which can be seen precisely thanks to the translation metaphor. As already mentioned, a good translator is aware of the change in the meaning during the act of translation and knows how to control this by working with the client. However, in addition to the metaphor, the author believes that social sciences such as anthropology, sociolinguistics, and ethnomethodology, which supplement the vision of the lawyer as a translator, can also help lawyers. By drawing on the achievements of these sciences, he, like J.B. White, links the process of translation to interpretation, which he understands as a collective and largely situational process that takes place in a multi-entity system. For the lawyer, as for the translator, the most important thing within this system should, of course, be the client. He/she should precede the translation with a process of interpretation in accordance with the methodologies of these sciences and, thanks to this approach, perceive the difference between his/her own and the client’s way of speaking and thinking, activate his/her imagination towards the client and, consequently, better understand his/her story.[16]

The author purports to embed considerations on the translation metaphor in a simple epistemology, according to which, mental activity is divided into three spheres – sensation, experience, and knowledge. Thus, the author does not assume that there is a dichotomy between the reality and the subject, but rather a relationship of a dynamic nature, because experience is constituted by sensation, and knowledge in turn by experience; the world of concepts is constituted by elements of experience. Consequently, the language plays a key role in the knowledge building – naming reduces the complexity of experience, exposes, formalizes, and stabilizes forms and relationships. Concepts are neither simple abstractions coming from experience nor derivations of transcendent ideas, but rather they are realized in the process of objectifying experience. In this model, reality is neither objective nor socially framed. In particular, it would not be advisable to use the latter, essentially metaphorical, term in reference to this model. This is because framing does not adequately account for how much language contributes to cognition. It also depicts cognition as a transition from experience to knowledge, while according to the author, it is a two-way process.[17]

Such an approach to knowledge and language allows the author to demonstrate that translation is essentially a culturally universal experience because, if done correctly and ethically, it involves a continuous circular movement from the statements made in the source language by the client to the translator’s equivalent statements and back again to confront them with the source language. The universality of this experience, according to the author, makes it possible to effectively construct a metaphor of the lawyer as a translator, and thus to explain, using the theory of cognitive metaphor, a certain more complicated sphere of life, namely the lawyer’s activities, by referring to more easily grasped activities of the translator.[18]

The metaphor of the lawyer as a translator naturally leads to the metaphor of representation as text – the client narrative is conceived here as a text to be submitted by the lawyer to a professional audience. It also brings to mind J.B. White’s characteristic relationship between law and literature, especially in the sphere of interpretation. As mentioned, however, the author refers primarily to social sciences. For example, by relying on the achievements of ethnography and its concept of the informant. The author assumes that culture is a text, while ethnography is a kind of literary practice of interpretation, citing the views of C. Geertz, according to whom the ethnographer’s task is to translate the informant’s language, which is often figurative for the researcher, into literal language that can then be interpreted in another culture.[19]

As part of the translational metaphor, this can be applied to the lawyer-client relationship in such a way that it is the lawyer who should treat the client as a kind of anthropological stranger and, therefore, as an informant – to gather material during the conversations and then study it in depth. In doing so, he/she should distance himself/herself and reduce the risk of misunderstanding arising from the assumption that they are both speaking the same language and using the same meanings. Therefore, the lawyer should first recognize the client’s text and look for the meaning that the client ascribes to it. So, before attempting to translate it into legal categories, they must distance themselves from what they hear from the client – enter the role of an anthropological observer. By failing to do so, lawyers often cause some loss, consisting in the fact that when imagining what the client means, using to this end the lens of legal terms, they are not able to understand what clients want to communicate to them, even using the same terms as the lawyers. Consequently, they are then unable to make a correct translation. Thus, it can be said that a lawyer, in order to be a good translator, must first imagine that one can speak a different language than that of the lawyer and that even words of basic meaning for the lawyer, such as entitlement or harm, can have a different meaning to his/her client.[20]

Turning to the evaluation of the metaphor in question and the related vision of legal professions, it should be emphasized that it captures a very important element of the lawyer’s work, i.e., the presence of the latter in the relations between different subjects, e.g., a client and a court, which also means the necessity to operate among different languages. It not only provides an opportunity to understand the lawyer’s work by relating his/her role to the translation business but also to use the ethics of translation in legal ethics. There are not only numerous similarities between the two fields but also a similar degree of dispute over fundamental issues. For instance, the ethics of the translator also analyzes issues of the extent of the translator’s moral responsibility, including the question of the social effects of translation as well as relations to the goals and commands of the message sender. The standard approach in this area centers around translation equivalence, which is essentially a linguistic issue. This results in the fact that the problem of the translator’s subjectivity is basically absent in the ethical sphere, and the whole discussion is reduced to the fidelity of the translation or adequacy between two texts in different languages. According to this view, the translator should be precise, neutral, loyal, and objective. In fact, it can be said that the best translator is a translator that is unnoticeable.[21]

However, as in legal ethics, in this case, there also has been a shift described as a socio-cultural one, which has moved the focus from the subject aspects of the translation to the translator as a subject, including the role he/she plays. One element of this shift was to draw attention to difficult translations, not only in the linguistic sense but also in ethical categories. These include written translations and oral interpretations of wartime; camp and prison experiences. Interestingly, metaphorical terms are used to prove that the neutrality of the translator’s activity is only apparent. In the discussed cases, the entire burden of the situation and the responsibility associated with it also affects the translator, who absorbs all the suffering associated with it like a sponge. The standard metaphor of a translator as someone merely lending his/her voice and, therefore, as a mechanically acting language intermediary, is countered by other terms such as being a cultural bridge as well as a spokesperson or even an advocate for the client. The last two metaphors express different visions of translation ethics. In each case, the question of neutrality is approached differently, each time recognizing, however, that the translator is not transparent and does not bear any responsibility for the acts of his/her translation.[22]

With regard to the first metaphor, i.e., a description of the translator as being a bridge or acting as a bridge-builder, this means that he/she is not a neutral transmitter – a sort of servant of two masters – but his/her task is to aim at reaching an agreement between the parties. It is his/her own purpose and his/her own responsibility, which is independent of the intentions of the parties to the communication. The act of translation is understood here as a kind of cultural mediation. In order to perform this task effectively, it is necessary to have confidence in the translator, which is derived from his/her own personal qualities. At the same time, it exposes him/her to possible conflicts with parties to the communication who may not be interested in seeking agreement, but, for instance, may be more interested in dominating the other party. The main question is whether the translator should then resist the will of such a client and pursue primarily his/her task of bridge-building, or whether he/she should submit to the client’s instructions. An analogous problem can be said to exist in legal ethics.[23]

This draws attention to the second metaphor, i.e., treating the translator as a spokesperson for the client, in particular as someone taking the side of the weaker participant in the act of communication. This approach is related to the critical perspective according to which the translation always encounters the problem of reproducing the dominant ideology. The translator as a subject is responsible for his/her texts and the narratives they contain and is not relieved of this responsibility by the fact that they are secondary in nature. This is because it is impossible to be a neutral transmitter of something that is intrinsically non-neutral, as can be seen most clearly in extreme situations such as wartime translations. However, this is a universal truth that applies to other translation acts as well. Consequently, the translator should not reproduce ideologies – he/she is a full participant in the interaction through whom communication can take place, and, as such, he/she has not only the right but also the duty to resist. He/she cannot simply stand in the middle of the communication, and thus between the narratives of the parties, because as a full participant in the communication process, he/she will always belong to one of them. If so, he/she should choose this affiliation on the basis of ethical criteria.[24] Thus, it can be said that the translation metaphor draws attention to the problem of the neutrality of the subject in the process of applying knowledge to specific cases. It shows how this neutrality is unobvious and how it can be problematized.



Beck U., Giddens A., Lash S., Modernizacja refleksyjna. Polityka tradycja i estetyka w porządku społecznym nowoczesności, Warsaw 2009.

Cunningham C.D., The Lawyer As Translator, Representation As Text: Towards An Ethnography Of Legal Discourse, “Cornell Law Review” 1991–1992, No. 77.

Giddens A., Konsekwencje nowoczesności, Kraków 2008.

Gizbert-Studnicki T., Język prawny a obraz świata, [in:] Prawo w zmieniającym się społeczeństwie. Księga jubileuszowa prof. Marii Boruckiej-Arctowej, ed. G. Skąpska, J. Czapska, K. Daniel, J. Górski, K. Pałecki, Kraków 1992.

Hamilton J.W., Metaphors of Lawyers’ Professionalism, “Alberta Law Review” 1995, No. 4.

Kaczmarek P., Era prawodawców czy era tłumaczy? O dylemacie wyboru roli interpretatora, [in:] Czy koniec teorii prawa? Z zagadnień teorii i filozofii prawa, ed. P. Jabłoński, Wrocław 2011.

Kaczmarek P., Zaufanie do zawodów prawniczych w społeczeństwie ryzyka, [in:] H. Izdebski, P. Skuczyński, Etyka prawnicza. Stanowiska i perspektywy 2, Warsaw 2011.

Kövecses Z., Metaphor. A Practical Introduction, Oxford 2010.

Lakoff G., Johnson M., Metaphors We Live By, Chicago 2003.

Parsons T., Spojrzenie socjologa na zawód prawnika, [in:] T. Parsons, Szkice z teorii socjologicznej, Warsaw 1972.

Parsons T., Wolne zawody a struktura społeczna, [in:] T. Parsons, Szkice z teorii socjologicznej, Warsaw 1972.

Skuczyński P., Metaphor of the Lawyer as an Architect and the Concept of Law, “Ordines” 2021, no. 2.

Tryuk M., Ty nic nie mów, ja będę tłumaczył. O etyce w tłumaczeniu ustnym, Warsaw 2012.

White J.B., Justice as Translation. An Essay in Cultural and Legal Criticism, Chicago and London 1990.

[1]  T. Parsons, Spojrzenie socjologa na zawód prawnika, [in:] T. Parsons, Szkice z teorii socjologicznej, Warsaw 1972, p. 480, 486; T. Parsons, Wolne zawody a struktura społeczna, [in:] T. Parsons, Szkice z teorii socjologicznej, Warsaw 1972.

[2]  A. Giddens, Konsekwencje nowoczesności, Kraków 2008, p. 15 et seq.; U. Beck, A. Giddens, S. Lash, Modernizacja refleksyjna. Polityka tradycja i estetyka w porządku społecznym nowoczesności, Warsaw 2009, p. 114 et seq. See also: P. Kaczmarek, Zaufanie do zawodów prawniczych w społeczeństwie ryzyka, [in:] H. Izdebski, P. Skuczyński, Etyka prawnicza. Stanowiska i perspektywy 2, Warsaw 2011, p. 11 et seq.

[3]  See for example: G. Lakoff, M. Johnson, Metaphors We Live By, Chicago 2003. See also: Z. Kövecses, Metaphor. A Practical Introduction, Oxford 2010; J.W. Hamilton, Metaphors of Lawyers’ Professionalism, “Alberta Law Review” 1995, No. 4, p. 839 et seq.

[4]  See: P. Skuczyński, Metaphor of the Lawyer as an Architect and the Concept of Law, “Ordines” 2021, No. 2, p. 363 et seq and the literature cited therein.

[5]  T. Gizbert-Studnicki, Język prawny a obraz świata, [in:] Prawo w zmieniającym się społeczeństwie. Księga jubileuszowa prof. Marii Boruckiej-Arctowej, ed. G. Skąpska, J. Czapska, K. Daniel, J. Górski, K. Pałecki, Kraków 1992, p. 149 et seq.

[6]  P. Kaczmarek, Era prawodawców czy era tłumaczy? O dylemacie wyboru roli interpretatora, [in:] Czy koniec teorii prawa? Z zagadnień teorii i filozofii prawa, ed. P. Jabłoński, Wrocław 2011, pp. 163–168.

[7]  J.B. White, Justice as Translation. An Essay in Cultural and Legal Criticism, Chicago and London 1990, pp. 7–14.

[8]  Ibidem, pp. 14–17, 24.

[9]   Ibidem, pp. 28, 35, 37.

[10] Ibidem, pp. 40, 90–91, 98.

[11] Ibidem, pp. 100–101, 105 et seq.

[12] Ibidem, pp. 229, 232–234.

[13] Ibidem, pp. 235–236, 241, 250, 252, 254, 258.

[14] Ibidem, pp. 248–249, 262.

[15] C.D. Cunningham, The Lawyer As Translator, Representation As Text: Towards An Ethnography Of Legal Discourse, “Cornell Law Review” 1991–1992, No. 77, pp. 1299–1300.

[16] Ibidem, pp. 1301–1302.

[17] Ibidem, pp. 1330–1334.

[18] Ibidem, pp. 1337–1338.

[19] Ibidem, pp. 1339–1446.

[20] Ibidem, pp. 1348–1351, 1356.

[21] M. Tryuk, Ty nic nie mów, ja będę tłumaczył. O etyce w tłumaczeniu ustnym, Warsaw 2012, pp. 18–19, 23–24.

[22] Ibidem, pp. 24, 26–27, 31.

[23] Ibidem, pp. 38, 43, 46.

[24] Ibidem, pp. 34–36, 49–51.